Who lost Afghanistan?

Key Points:

• The author argues that the common consensus that the American response to 9/11 was an "overreaction" is incorrect, emphasizing that the real mistake was the U.S. undercommitting resources to Afghanistan after the initial victory over the Taliban in 2001.
• The Taliban quickly collapsed in late 2001 due to U.S. support for the Northern Alliance, but the U.S. focus shifted to Iraq, leading to insufficient troop levels and engagement in Afghanistan, which allowed the Taliban to regroup and launch an insurgency.
• Pakistan's complex role, including its intelligence services' support for the Taliban as a strategic hedge against India and Afghanistan, further complicated U.S. efforts, and the U.S. failed to develop a coherent relationship with Pakistan to address this issue.
• The Obama administration's troop surge in Afghanistan temporarily pushed back the insurgency but was ultimately a short-term effort, as the Taliban waited out the Americans and returned once the surge ended.
• The author concludes that the U.S. did not overreact militarily in Afghanistan but rather severely underreacted by diverting attention and resources to Iraq, which contributed significantly to the ongoing failure and tragedy in Afghanistan.